The Social Influences on Scientific Significance: Kitcher, the Unity of Science, and Democratized Science Policy
Pirtle, Zach
Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University
Mentor: Creath, Richard; Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University
What relationship exists between science and the social context that surrounds it? Philosopher Philip Kitcher’s 2001 Science, Truth and Democracy utilizes the philosophy of science to argue for a democratic engagement of science policy. Kitcher’s democratic position represents a major shift in his philosophical and political beliefs. The book culminates with a proposed ideal, well-ordered science (WOS), which Kitcher offers as a guide for establishing more democratic approaches to science policy. The justification of democratized science is critical, and benefits from a technical philosophical perspective beyond what Kitcher provides in the book. To argue for WOS, Kitcher has to establish that social values have a role in establishing the significance of all scientific work. In situations of practical significance, the role of social values is clear, but Kitcher must show that epistemic significance cannot be isolated from social values as well. The key to WOS comes from Kitcher’s change of position on scientific explanation. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Kitcher worked to establish that science was generating explanations that were accumulating into an ultimate storehouse of explanations. Now, Kitcher argues that the epistemic significance of this store of explanation can only be dependent on social context. In conjunction with other arguments, Kitcher uses the context-dependence of scientific significance to justify the guidance of science by democratic oversight. This poster will place Kitcher’s argument for the context-dependence of epistemic significance in perspective, describe how it founds WOS, and articulate how WOS can be used to justify democratic changes to science policy.